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Abstract 
This study estimates the combined direct and indirect rebound effects from various types of 
energy efficiency improvement by UK households. In contrast to most studies of this topic, 
we base our estimates on cross-price elasticities and therefore capture both the income and 
substitution effects of energy efficiency improvements. Our approach involves estimating a 
household demand model to obtain price and expenditure elasticities of different goods and 
services, utilising a multiregional input-output model to estimate the GHG emission 
intensities of those goods and services, combining the two to estimate direct and indirect 
rebound effects, and decomposing those effects to reveal the relative contribution of different 
mechanisms and commodities. We estimate that the total rebound effects are 41% for 
measures that improve the efficiency of domestic gas use, 48% for electricity use and 78% 
for vehicle fuel use. The primary source of this rebound is increased consumption of the 
cheaper energy service (i.e. direct rebound) and this is primarily driven by substitution 
effects. Our results suggest that the neglect of substitution effects may have led prior research 
to underestimate the total rebound effect. However, we provide a number of caveats to this 
conclusion, as well as indicating priorities for future research. 
 
Keywords: Rebound effects; Income and substitution effects; linear almost ideal demand 
system  
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1 Introduction 
‘Rebound effects’ is a widely used term for a variety of economic responses to improved 
energy efficiency. The net result of these effects is typically to increase energy consumption 
and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions relative to a counterfactual baseline in which these 
responses do not occur. To the extent that rebound effects are neglected in policy appraisals, 
the energy and emissions ‘saved’ by such measures may be less than anticipated.  
Studies of rebound effects for consumers typically focus upon the direct effects that result 
from increased consumption of cheaper energy services. For example, fuel-efficient cars 
make driving cheaper so people may drive further and/or more often (Small and Van Dender, 
2007; Sorrell, 2007). But a comprehensive accounting of the global environmental impact of 
energy efficiency improvements must also take into account various indirect rebound effects. 
For example, any savings on fuel bills may be put towards increased consumption of other 
goods and services whose provision also involves energy use and emissions at different 
stages of their global supply chains (Chitnis et al., 2013; Druckman et al., 2011). To quantify 
indirect rebound effects, it is necessary to combine econometric analysis of household 
(re)spending patterns with estimates of the energy and emissions ‘embodied’ within different 
categories of goods and services. The latter, in turn can be derived from environmentally 
extended, multiregional input-output models (Druckman and Jackson, 2009; Turner et al., 
2007; Wiedmann et al., 2007). 
Relatively few studies estimate both direct and indirect rebound effects and most of these rely 
upon expenditure elasticities rather than cross-price elasticities. As a result, they capture the 
income effects of energy efficiency improvements but not the substitution effects (Chitnis et 
al., 2014). To appreciate the distinction, consider a household that installs insulation and 
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recovers the capital costs over ten years through lower heating bills. Since the bill savings 
exactly offset the capital costs, the investment provides no increase in real income over this 
period - so the income effect is zero. Hence, studies that focus solely upon income effects 
would estimate the direct and indirect rebound effects over that period to be zero as well. But 
since the unit cost of heating has fallen relative to that of other goods and services, the 
household is likely to consume more heating and fewer goods and services that are 
‘substitutes’ to heating. At the same time, the household may consume more of other goods 
and services that are ‘complements’ to heating. The net result will be a shift in consumption 
patterns and hence a change in the GHG emissions associated with that consumption that may 
offset the original emission savings. Hence, it is possible that studies that neglect substitution 
will underestimate rebound effects. 
This study therefore addresses the limitations of the existing literature by: a) estimating the 
magnitude of both direct and indirect rebound effects following the adoption of energy 
efficiency measures by households; b) identifying the relative contribution of income and 
substitution effects to these results; and c) identifying the relative contribution of individual 
goods and services. This is the first study to estimate these effects for UK households, as well 
as the first to decompose them to this level of detail. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the relevant concepts, highlights 
some methodological trade-offs and summarises the existing literature. Section 3 outlines the 
methodology, including the data sources used, the economic model adopted and the 
econometric techniques employed. Section 4 presents the results, including the estimates of 
direct and indirect rebound effects and the contribution of different mechanisms and 
commodities to those effects. Section 5 concludes by discussing the robustness of the results, 
their implications and the priorities for future work.  
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2 Concepts and previous work 
2.1 Direct rebound effects 
Cost-effective energy efficiency improvements reduce the effective price of energy services 
such as heating and lighting, thereby encouraging increased consumption of those services 
that offsets the initial energy and emission savings. The marginal change in the energy ( eq ) 
required to provide a given quantity of energy service ( sq ) following a marginal change in 
energy efficiency ( es qq / ) may be expressed as: 

 
ln
ln
,


 eq
q
e  1 
As shown by Sorrell and Dimitropoulos (2007a), this may be written as:
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Where 
ss pq ,
  is the own-price elasticity of demand for the energy service ( sq ) with respect 
to the energy cost of that service ( /es pp  ). The negative of this elasticity is commonly 
taken as a measure of the direct rebound effect (RD) (Sorrell and Dimitropoulos, 2007a): 
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If the energy service is a normal good ( 0, ss pq ) there will be a positive direct rebound 
effect ( 0DR ). This may be decomposed into a substitution effect and an income effect
2
 
using the Slutsky equation: 
xqspqpq sssss
w ,,,
~  
 4 
Where: sw  is the share of the energy service in total household expenditure (x); xqs ,  is the 
expenditure elasticity of the energy service; and 
ss pq ,
~  is the compensated own-price 
elasticity of demand for the energy service, holding utility constant. The income ( DRˆ ) and 
substitution ( DR
~
) components of the direct rebound effect are then as follows:  
xqsD s
wR ,
ˆ   5 
ss pqD
R ,
~~   6 
DDD RRR
~ˆ   7 
Income and substitution effects may either offset or reinforce one another (Table A.1). If 
estimates of 
ss pq ,
  are available the direct rebound effect can be derived, and if estimates of 
xqs ,
  are also available it can be decomposed. In contrast, if only estimates of xqs ,  are 
available, then only the income effect can be obtained. This will form a biased estimate of the 
direct rebound effect since substitution effects will be overlooked.  
  
                                                 
2 The former is the change in consumption that would result from the change in relative prices if real income were adjusted 
to keep utility constant, while the latter is the change in consumption that would result exclusively from this change in 
real income. 
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2.2 Indirect rebound effects 
Energy efficiency improvements may also change the quantity demanded of other goods and 
services. These include both other energy services (e.g. heating) and other non-energy goods 
and services (e.g. furniture) that ‘embody’ the energy and emissions required to manufacture 
and deliver them. These changes in consumption patterns will impact energy use and 
emissions at each stage of the relevant supply chains. From a global perspective, these 
changes may either offset or add to the energy and emission savings from the energy 
efficiency improvement depending on whether the quantity demanded of the relevant goods 
or service has increased or fallen. The indirect rebound effect (
iI
R ) from an individual 
commodity (i) will be proportional to this change in energy and emissions, which in turn will 
depend upon: the energy or emissions intensity of the commodity relative to that of the 
energy service; and the elasticity of demand for that commodity with respect to the price of 
the energy service. The latter is defined as: 
s
i
pq p
q
si ln
ln
, 

  8 
Again, this elasticity can be decomposed: 
xqspqpq isisi
w ,,,
~    9 
Where: sw  is the share of the energy service in total household expenditure; xqi ,  is the 
expenditure elasticity of commodity i; and 
si pq ,
~  is the compensated elasticity of demand for 
commodity i with respect to the energy cost of the energy service. The substitution effect for 
commodity i (
si pq ,
~ ) may offset or reinforce the income effect ( xqs iw , ) for that 
commodity (Table A.2). Consumption of commodities that are complements (substitutes) to 
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the energy service will increase (reduce) following the energy efficiency improvement. The 
impact of this on emissions will depend upon the emissions intensity of each commodity. If 
estimates of both 
si pq ,
  and xqi ,  are available the indirect rebound effects for each 
commodity can be derived and decomposed (
iIIiI RRR i
~ˆ  ), but if only estimates of xqi ,  
are available, only the income effect can be obtained. To estimate the overall indirect rebound 
effect we need to sum the corresponding change in emissions over all commodities 
(  i II iRR ).   
2.3 Estimating direct and indirect rebound effects 
To estimate direct and indirect rebound effects we need estimates of the own- and cross-price 
elasticities for the relevant energy service. This requires the estimation of a household 
demand model - namely, a system of n equations representing household demand for n 
commodities as a function of total expenditure, commodity prices and other variables, with 
one of these commodities being the energy service (s). 
A growing number of studies estimate own-price elasticities for individual energy services 
(
ss pq ,
 ), but to our knowledge no study has estimated cross-price elasticities (
si pq ,
 ) owing 
the difficulties of specifying energy services as a ‘commodity’ within a household demand 
model (Sorrell, 2010). Since energy services are produced from a combination of energy 
commodities (e.g. gas) and durable goods (e.g. boilers), specifying their energy cost ( sp ) and 
quantity demanded ( sq ) involves combining data on energy commodity purchases with 
additional data on the ownership and energy efficiency of the relevant durables (Conrad and 
Schröder, 1991). Since this data may not be available, a simpler alternative is to estimate a 
model for purchased commodities (i) and to simulate energy efficiency improvements by a 
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reduction in the price of the relevant energy commodities (e) (Brännlund et al., 2007). So, for 
example, more efficient boilers may be simulated by a reduction in the unit price of natural 
gas (pe), since both will reduce the energy cost of heating (ps). Elasticities may then be 
estimated with respect to energy commodity prices ( ep ), rather than energy service prices 
( sp ) and used to estimate both direct and indirect rebound effects. This approach is simpler 
to implement but, as discussed below, may potentially lead to biased estimates of rebound 
effects.  
It is common to formulate household demand models in terms of expenditures ( ix ) rather 
than quantity demanded ( iq ) since expenditures are easier to measure. It is straightforward to 
convert between the two using the following relationships: 
iiii pqpx ,,
1   ;  
jiii pqpx ,,
~1~   ;  10 
jiji pqpx ,,
 
;  jiji
pqpx ,,
~~  
  11 
xqxx ii ,,
   12 
Household demand models can be estimated from time series or pooled cross-sectional data 
on household expenditures and commodity prices. But the number of coefficients to be 
estimated limits the degrees of freedom, with the result that expenditures need to be 
aggregated into a limited number of commodity groups. For the same reason, such models 
provide limited scope for including covariates and typically require restrictions to be imposed 
upon the parameter values to increase the degrees of freedom. A common strategy is to 
assume separability of preferences between aggregate commodity groups such as food and 
transport, implying that decisions on how much to spend on one group (e.g. transport) are 
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separate from decisions on how to allocate this expenditure between the goods and services 
within that group (e.g. bus, car or train travel) (Deaton and Muellbaeur, 1980).
3
 This is a 
restrictive assumption, but it can work reasonably well if the categories are well chosen.  
2.4 Previous work 
Tables 3 and 4 classify the limited number of studies that estimate both direct and indirect 
rebound effects for households - with those in Table 1 using expenditure elasticities (income 
effects) and those in Table 2 using cross-price elasticities (income and substitution effects). 
While most studies focus upon improved energy efficiency in electricity, heating or car 
travel, others examine ‘sufficiency’ measures such as reducing car travel or food waste.4 
Different studies estimate rebound effects in energy, carbon and GHG terms, but no study 
estimates and compares all three. This diversity, combined with the methodological 
limitations of each study (Sorrell, 2010) makes it difficult to draw robust conclusions. 
. 
                                                 
3 ‘Weak separability’ implies that the marginal rate of substitution between commodities in one group is independent of the 
quantities of other commodities in other groups. This allows the demand for commodities within a group to be written 
solely as a function of the expenditure on the group and the prices of commodities within the group, with the prices of 
other commodities only affecting the group expenditure and not the allocation of expenditure within the group. 
4 Since sufficiency measures do not change the effective price of the energy service, there are no associated substitution 
effects.  
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Table 1: Studies estimating combined direct and indirect rebound effects for households –income effects only 
Author Region No. of commodity 
categories 
Measure Area  Metric Energy/ 
emissions 
Estimated rebound 
effect (%) 
Lenzen and Day 
(2002) 
Australia 150 Efficiency & 
sufficiency 
Food; heating GHGs Direct and 
embodied 
45-123% 
Alfreddson 
(2004) 
Sweden 300 Sufficiency Food; travel; utilities CO2 Direct and 
embodied 
7-300% 
Druckman et al 
(2011) 
UK 16 Sufficiency Transport, heating, 
food 
GHGs Direct and 
embodied 
7-51%  
Thomas and 
Azevedo 
(2013)  
US 13 Efficiency Transport, electricity Energy and 
CO2 
Direct and 
embodied 
7-25%  
Murray  
(2013) 
Australia 36 Efficiency & 
sufficiency 
Transport, lighting GHGs Direct and 
embodied 
4–24%  
Chitnis et al 
(2013) 
UK 16 Efficiency Heating, lighting GHGs Direct and 
embodied 
5–15% 
Chitnis et al 
(2014)  
UK 16 Efficiency and 
sufficiency 
Transport, heating, 
lighting, food 
GHGs Direct and 
embodied 
5-106% 
  
12 
 
Table 2: Studies estimating combined direct and indirect rebound effects for households – income and substitution effects 
Author Region No. of commodity 
categories 
Measure Area  Metric Energy/ 
emissions 
Estimated rebound 
effect (%) 
Brannlund et al 
(2007) 
Sweden 13 Efficiency Transport; utilities CO2 Direct and 
embodied 
120-175% 
Mizobuchi (2008) Japan 13 Efficiency Transport; utilities CO2 Direct and 
embodied 
12-38% 
Lin et al (2013) China 10 Efficiency Transport; utilities CO2 Direct and 
embodied 
37% 
Kratena and Wuger 
(2008) 
Austria 6 Efficiency Transport; heating; 
electricity 
Energy Direct only 37-86% 
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Brannlund et al (2007) was the first study to use cross-price elasticities to estimate combined 
direct and indirect rebound effects. Using survey data for Swedish households over the period 
1980-1997, Brannlund et al estimate a household demand model
5
 for 13 categories of non-
durable expenditure. Separability assumptions are used to: first, allocate expenditure between 
durables and non-durables; second, allocate non-durable expenditure between four aggregate 
groups (food, transport, domestic energy and other); and third, distribute the group 
expenditures between individual commodities within each group (e.g. domestic energy is 
subdivided into oil, electricity and district heating). Brannlund et al then simulate a 20% 
energy efficiency improvement in transport and domestic energy by reducing the price of 
each commodity in proportion to the estimated contribution of energy to total costs, and then 
recalculate the model to estimate the impact on global carbon emissions. The results suggest 
a rebound effect of 121% for transport efficiency improvements, 175% for domestic energy 
and 140% for both combined.
6
 
Brannlund et al do not separately investigate efficiency improvements in electricity and 
heating fuels, do not distinguish between direct and embodied emissions and do not calculate 
the relative contribution of income and substitution effects to their results - despite estimating 
the relevant elasticities. More importantly, their estimated rebound effects are remarkably 
large and suggest that direct rebound effects alone exceed 100%. This contradicts the results 
of a growing body of work that estimates direct rebound effects for these energy services in 
OECD households (Sorrell et al., 2009), together with a larger body of work that estimates 
the corresponding energy price elasticities (Sorrell and Dimitropoulos, 2007b).  
                                                 
5 All three of the studies described here estimate the linear Linear Almost Ideal Demand System (LAIDS) introduced by 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). 
6 The presentation of results is misleading. For example, transport efficiency is estimated to reduce carbon emissions by 
6.2% in the absence of rebound effects but to increase carbon emissions by 1.3% once rebound effects are accounted 
for. Brannlund et al. report this as a rebound effect of 7.5%, whereas the correct value is 121%. 
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Mizobuchi (2008) takes a similar approach to Brannlund et al, using monthly expenditure 
data for Japanese households over the period 1990-98.
7
 He also employs multistage 
budgeting, but in contrast to Brännlund et al, the 13 commodities represent expenditure on 
both durables and non-durables (e.g. both cars and road fuel) and hence cover all household 
emissions. Mizobuchi simulates simultaneous reductions in the price of domestic energy and 
road fuels, but the percentage improvements are different from those in Brannlund et al and 
vary from one commodity to another. Two scenarios are investigated: one where the 
efficiency improvements are costless, and a second where adjustments are made to reflect the 
additional capital cost of energy-efficient equipment.
8
 This leads to an estimated rebound 
effect of 115% in the first scenario (similar to Brannlund et al) and 27% in the second. 
Mizobuchi argues that allowing for capital costs reduces the cost savings and hence the 
estimated rebound effects. But the manner in which this scenario is implemented also 
changes the relative cost savings between electricity, gas, heating oil and vehicle fuels, 
leading to substitution between them that modifies the estimated rebound effects. Since 
Mizobuchi does not report the rebound effects for each individual efficiency improvement, 
the drivers of the results are obscured. 
Lin and Liu (2013) also follow Brannlund et al’s approach, using annual data for Chinese 
urban households over the period 1986-2007. Their focus is a 30% improvement in energy 
efficiency for transport and domestic energy, but the assumed price reductions in each 
                                                 
7 Methodological innovations include Bayesian estimation methods and the use of an iterative procedure to estimate rebound 
effects. 
8 Mizobuchi assumes 20% improvement in the efficiency of electricity and road fuel use, 10% in gas use and 3% in heating 
oil use. Achieving these is assumed to require a 22% increase in expenditure on durables for electricity, 35% for gas, 
12% for heating oil and 28% for vehicles. The final percentage change in the price of the relevant subcategory (e.g. car 
transport) then depends upon the relative proportion of durable and nondurable expenditure within that category. The 
method of calculating additional capital costs is crude and leads, for example, to the odd result that fuel-efficient cars 
are more expensive than inefficient cars. This is because newer and more fuel-efficient cars of a particular model type 
are more expensive than older and less efficient cars of the same type. But this neglects the differences in cost and fuel 
efficiency between model types in the same year and between different sizes of vehicle. 
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subcategory are not specified. They estimate a total rebound effect of 37%, of which 12.6% is 
direct and 24.4% indirect.
9
 But they do not separately estimate the rebound effects for 
transport and domestic energy, and do not specify the relative contribution of income and 
substitution effects to their results. 
Finally, Kratena and Wuger (2008) provide only a partial picture since they confine attention 
to a subset of commodity groups and neglect embodied emissions. They find large rebound 
effects (37-86%), but this study has not been peer-reviewed and has a number of weaknesses 
(Sorrell, 2010).  
In sum, the existing evidence base is limited and inadequately explained. The estimated 
rebound effects from both the Brannlund and Mizobuchi studies appear larger than those in 
Table 1 and inconsistent with the growing literature on direct rebound effects. Also, none of 
the studies in Table 2 clarify the relative contribution of income and substitution effects to 
their results, or the relative contribution of direct and embodied emissions. Our analysis 
addresses these limitations. 
3 Methodology 
Our approach involves estimating a household demand model to derive price and expenditure 
elasticities of different goods and services, utilising a multiregional input-output model to 
estimate the GHG emission intensities of those goods and services, combining the two to 
estimate direct and indirect rebound effects, and decomposing those effects to reveal the 
relative contribution of different mechanisms and commodities. Section 3.1 develops 
                                                 
9 The numbers in the summary and abstract of Lin and Liu (2013) are incorrect, while those in the body of the paper are 
correct. 
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analytical expressions for these effects, Section 3.2 describes the econometric model and 
Section 3.3 summarises the data. 
3.1 Rebound model  
Assume a household makes a costless investment that increases the energy efficiency ( ) of 
providing an energy service (s) by  /  ( 0 ), thereby reducing the energy cost ( sp ) 
of that service by ss pp /  ( 0 ). Let Q represent the household’s baseline GHG 
emissions (direct plus embodied), H  the change in emissions that would occur without any 
behavioural responses to the lower cost energy service (the ‘engineering effect’), G  the 
change in emissions that results from those behavioural responses (the ‘re-spending effect’), 
and GHQ   the net change in GHG emissions. The total rebound effect (RT) is then 
given by: 
H
G
H
QH
RT






 13 
As discussed above, this is comprised of direct and indirect effects ( IDT RRR  ) which 
may each be decomposed into income and substitution effects ( DDD RRR
~ˆ   and 
III RRR
~ˆ  ). 
The baseline GHG emissions for the household may be written as: 



)( sii
i
xx
ss xuuxQ i  14 
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Where ix  is the expenditure on commodity i (in £), 
x
i
u  is the GHG intensity of that 
expenditure (in tCO2e/£) and sx  and 
x
su  are the corresponding values of these variables for 
the energy service. The GHG intensities include both direct and embodied emissions 
To estimate the engineering effect ( H ), we assume the consumption of all commodities 
remains unchanged while the energy cost of the energy service falls. The change in 
expenditure on the energy service as a consequence of the engineering effect is then given by 
ss
H
s pqx  . Given that ss pp   and 
H
s
x
s xuH   we obtain the following expression for 
the engineering effect: 
s
xxuH s  15 
To estimate the re-spending effect ( G ), we must allow for the change in expenditure on 
each commodity group ( ix ).The change in expenditure on the energy service itself as a 
consequence of the engineering effect is given by ss
G
s qpx  .
10
 Adding in the change of 
expenditure on other commodity groups we obtain the following expression for the re-
spending effect: 



)( sii
i
x
i
G
s
x
s xuxuG  16 
Assuming marginal changes, we can use elasticities to substitute for 
G
sx and ix  in this 
equation: 
                                                 
10 For the energy service itself, the total change in expenditure is the sum of the engineering and re-spending effects: 
G
s
H
ss xxx   
18 
 



)(
,, )1(
sii
pxi
x
pxs
x
s siiss
xuxuG   17 
Substituting the expressions for H  (Equation 15) and G  (Equation 17) into Equation 13 
and noting that xxw ii / , we arrive at the following expression for the total rebound effect: 



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,, )1(
sii
pxipxT siss
R 
 18 
Where: 
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x
x
i   19 
For ease of exposition, we express elasticities in quantity form in what follows. Using 
Equations 10 to 12, the total rebound effect can also be expressed as: 



)(
,,
sii
pqipqT siss
R 
 20 
The first term in Equation 20 is the direct rebound effect (RD) and the second is the indirect 
effect (RI). The first depends solely upon the own-price elasticity of energy service demand 
(
ss pq ,
 ), while the second depends upon the elasticity of demand for commodity i with 
respect to the energy service (
si pq ,
 ) and the GHG intensity and expenditure share of that 
commodity relative to that of the energy service ( i ). Hence, commodities with a small 
cross-price elasticity may nevertheless contribute a large indirect rebound effect if they are 
relatively GHG intensive and/or have a large expenditure share (and vice versa). 
Using the Slutsky equation, we decompose Equation 20 as follows: 
19 
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As noted, the challenges of incorporating energy services within a household demand model 
make it difficult to implement this approach directly. Hence, in what follows we estimate the 
required elasticities with respect to energy commodities (l) rather than energy services (s). 
Table 3 summarises the required expressions. 
Table 3 Analytical expressions for the components of the rebound effect 
 Direct rebound effect Indirect rebound effect for 
commodity i 
Income effect  
xqeD e
wR ,
ˆ   xqeiI ii wR ,
ˆ   
Substitution effect 
ee pq
DR ,
~~   
eii pq
iIR ,
~~   
3.2 Econometric model 
As with the other studies in Table 2, we base our household demand model on the Linear 
Approximation to the Almost Ideal Demand System (LAIDS). This has become the model of 
choice in household demand analysis since it has number of advantages over competing 
approaches (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). As a compromise between resolution and 
degrees of freedom, we split household expenditure into 12 subcategories (Table 4) and 
assume separability to give a two-stage budgeting framework (Figure 1). Households are 
assumed to first allocate expenditure between four aggregate groups (r), and then distribute 
the group expenditures between individual commodities within each group (i). This 
framework allows expenditure on commodities within a group to be specified as a function of 
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group expenditure and the prices of commodities within the group alone. As with Mizobuchi 
(2008), the commodity categories include both durables and nondurables.  
Table 4 Categories of goods and services 
Aggregate Group (r)  
Stage 1 
Category (i) 
Stage 2 
COICOP 
category 
Description 
1. Food and 
beverages 
1 1 Food and non-alcoholic beverages 
2 2 Alcoholic beverages, tobacco, narcotics 
2. Transport 3 7.2.2.2 Vehicle fuels and lubricants 
 4 Rest of 7 Other transport 
3. Energy 5 4.5.1 Electricity 
 6 4.5.2 Gas 
 7 4.5.3 and 4.5.4 Other fuels 
4. Other goods and 
services 
8 9 
Recreation & culture 
 9 11 Restaurants & hotels 
 10 10 Education 
 11 8 Communication 
 12  
3 
4.1 to 4.4 
5 
 
6 
12 
Other 
Clothing and footwear 
Other housing 
Furnishings, household equipment & 
household maintenance 
Health 
Miscellaneous goods and services 
Notes: COICOP - Classification of Individual Consumption According to Purpose. ‘Other housing’ includes 
rent, mortgage payments, maintenance, repair and water supply. ‘Other transport’ includes public transport, non-
fuel expenditure on private vehicles and some aviation – although air travel for package holidays is included 
within ‘recreation and culture’. ‘Other fuels’ include solids and liquids. 
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Figure 1 Two-stage budgeting model 
 
Let rtx  represent the expenditure on aggregate commodity group r in period t and 
r
tw  the 
fractional share of that group in total household expenditure ( tx ):  
t
r
tr
x
x
w
t
  22 
In the first stage of the LAIDS model, this is specified as: 
r
t
s
s
t
rs
tt
r
s
s
t
rsrr
t wPxpw   


 3,..1
1
4,..1
)/ln(ln
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Where: r and s index over the aggregate commodity groups; 
s
tp  is the price of the aggregate 
commodity group s in period t; xt is total expenditure per household in that period; Pt is the 
Stone’s price index for the aggregate commodities; 
s
tw 1  is the lagged expenditure share of 
commodity group s; 
r , rs , r  and rs are the unknown parameters and rt  is the error 
term. The Stone's price index is defined as:  
Household 
expenditure 
Food & 
beverages 
Food & non-
alcoholic 
beverages 
Alcoholic 
beverages & 
tobacco 
Transport 
Vehicle fuels & 
lubricants 
Other transport 
Energy 
Electricity 
Gas 
Other fuels 
Other goods and 
services 
Recreation & 
culture 
Restaurants & 
hotels 
Education 
Communication 
Other 
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


4,..1
lnln
r
r
t
r
tt pwP  24 
Our model departs from standard applications of LAIDS by including lagged expenditure 
shares (
s
tw 1 ) to capture the inertia in price responses - for example as a result of habit 
formation. The inclusion of lags also reduces problems of serial correlation (Edgerton, 1997; 
Klonaris and Hallam, 2003; Ryan and Plourde, 2009; Shukur, 2002). Since the lagged 
expenditure shares sum to unity, we only include three in each equation to avoid multi-
collinearity.
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We impose restrictions on the parameter values to ensure the results are compatible with 
consumer demand theory.
12
 Specifically, adding up requires that expenditures on each 
commodity add up to total expenditure; homogeneity requires that quantity demanded 
remains unchanged if prices and total expenditure change by an equal proportion; and 
symmetry requires that the Slustky matrix is symmetric . These restrictions are implemented 
as follows: 
 
Adding up:   
r
r 1 ;  
r
r 0  ;  
r
rs 0  s=1,..4;  and  
r
rs 0   s=1,..3; 
Homogeneity:   
r
rs 0  s=1,..4;    Symmetry: srrs     
                                                 
11 An alternative to dropping the lagged budget share of one commodity would be to impose the restriction:  
s
rs 0 . 
This would not affect the estimated coefficients. 
12 
Alternatively, an unrestricted model can be estimated for both the first and second stage and the homogeneity and 
symmetry restrictions tested. It is common for these restrictions to be rejected in empirical studies (Keuzenkamp and 
Barten, 1995). For example, the foundational LAIDS study by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) rejected these 
restrictions. The adding up restriction, however, is always satisfied by dropping one of the equations. 
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The second stage of the LAIDS model distributes the group expenditures (
r
tx ) between 
individual commodities within each group. Let 
r
itx  represent expenditure on commodity i in 
aggregate group r during period t ( ri ) and 
r
itw  represent the fractional share of that 
commodity in the expenditure on group r (
r
tx ): 
r
t
r
itr
it
x
x
w   25 
This is specified as: 
 
r
it
kj
r
jt
r
ij
r
t
r
t
r
i
kj
r
ij
r
ij
r
i
r
it
rr
wPxpw   


 )1,..(1
1
,..1
)/ln(ln
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Where: i and j index over the commodities within aggregate group r ( rji , ); rk  is the 
number of commodities in aggregate group r; 
r
itp  is the price of commodity i in aggregate 
group r in period t; 
r
tx  is expenditure on group r in that period; 
r
tP  is the Stone’s price index 
for group r; 
r
i , 
r
ij  
r
i  and 
r
ij  are the unknown parameters and 
r
it  is the error term. The 
Stone's price index for group r is defined as:   



rki
r
it
r
it
r
t pwP
,..1
lnln
 27 
Again, the adding up, symmetry and homogeneity restrictions are imposed as follows: 
 
Adding up:   
i
r
i 1 ;  
i
r
i 0  ;  
i
ij
0 ;  j = 1,..kr  and  
i
r
ij 0   j = 1,.(k
r
 -1) 
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Homogeneity:   
i
r
ij 0   j = 1,..k
r     
Symmetry: 
r
ji
r
ij     
Goddard (1983) derives equations for estimating the short run expenditure and price 
elasticities for a single stage LAIDS model
13
, while Edgerton (1997) derives expressions for a 
two-stage model. In the latter, ‘total’ elasticities are calculated from estimates of the 
‘between-group’ and ‘within-group’ elasticities. The interpretation of these is summarised in 
Box 1 and the relevant formulae are summarised in Table 5 (Edgerton, 1997). Both express 
the elasticities in terms of quantities rather than expenditures, using the conversions indicated 
in Equations 10 to 12.  Here, rs  (Kronecker delta) is equal to unity when r=s (i.e. own-price 
elasticity) and zero otherwise. Similarly, rij  is unity when i=j and zero otherwise.  
  
                                                 
13 Buse (1994) evaluates several elasticity expressions for LAIDS model and finds these expressions are marginally the best. 
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Box 1 Interpretation of the between-group, within-group and total elasticities 
1. Between-group expenditure ( xqr , ) and price ( sr pq ,  and sr pq ,
~ ) elasticities for the 
aggregate commodity groups (r) respectively indicate how the quantity demanded of 
aggregate group r changes following: a) a change in total expenditure; and b) a 
change in the price of aggregate group s holding total expenditure fixed.  
2. Within-group expenditure ( r xq ri , ) and price (
r
pq ji ,
  and r pq ji ,
~ ) elasticities for each 
commodity i within aggregate group r respectively indicate how the quantity 
demanded of this commodity changes following: a) a change in expenditure on group 
r; and b) a change in the price of commodity j within aggregate group r holding 
expenditure on group r fixed. Here, both i and j are within the same aggregate group. 
3. Total expenditure (
xqi ,
 ) and price (
ji pq ,
  and 
ji pq ,
~ ) elasticities for each commodity 
i within aggregate group r respectively indicate how the quantity demanded of this 
commodity changes following: a) a change in total expenditure; and b) a change in the 
price of commodity j holding total expenditure fixed but allowing expenditure on 
group r to vary. Here, i and j may be within the same or different aggregate group.  
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Table 5: Analytical expressions for the between-group, within-group and total elasticities within a two-stage LAIDS model 
Elasticity Between-group Within-group ( rji , ) Total 
Expenditure 
r
r
xq
wr

 1,  r
i
r
ir
xq
wri

 1,  xq
r
xqxq rrii ,,,
   
Uncompensated 
price 
rs
r
s
rrs
pq
w
w
sr


 

,  
r
ijr
i
r
j
r
i
r
ijr
pq
w
w
ji


 

,  
s
jpqrs
r
xq
r
pqrspq
w
srrijiji
)( ,,,,    
Compensated price 
rss
r
rs
pq w
wsr


 ,
~
 
r
ij
r
jr
i
r
ijr
pq w
wji


 ,
~  
s
jpqrs
r
xq
r
pqrspq
w
srrijiji
)~(~~ ,,,,    
Source: Edgerton (1997); Goddard (1983) 
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The formulae in Table 5 deserve some explanation. The formula for the total expenditure 
elasticity for the ith commodity in the rth group (Table 5, line 2) is simply the product of the 
within-group elasticity for that commodity and the expenditure elasticity of the group.  
The formula for the total uncompensated price elasticity (Table 5, line 3) is more complex. 
Note first that when commodities i and j are in different groups, 0rs  and the expression 
reduces to: 
s
jpq
r
xqpq
w
srriji
,,,
   28 
Here, the first term (
r
xq ri ,
 ) represents the change in quantity demanded of commodity i 
following a change in expenditure on group r; the second term represents the change in 
quantity demanded of group r following a change in the price of group s; and the third term 
represents the share of commodity j in the expenditure on group s. As shown by Edgerton 
(1997), the latter is equivalent to the change in the price of group s following a change in the 
price of commodity j ( js
s
j ppw ln/ln  ).  
When i and j are in the same group (r=s), the expression becomes: 
r
jpq
r
xq
r
pqpq wrrrijiji )1( ,,,,    29 
Here, the total cross-price elasticity equals the within-group cross-price elasticity ( r pq ji , ), 
plus a product of three factors. The first of these ( r xq ri , ) measures the change in quantity 
demanded of commodity i following a change in expenditure on group r; the second 
measures the change in quantity demanded of group r following a change in the price of 
group r; and the third represents the change in the price of group r following a change in the 
28 
 
price of commodity j ( jr
r
j ppw ln/ln  ).The smaller each of these terms are, the smaller 
the difference between the within-group and total price elasticity. The formula for the total 
compensated price elasticity (Table 5, line 4) follows a similar pattern. 
We estimate these elasticities using the expenditure shares for the last year of the time series 
(2013). The total elasticities are used for estimating rebound effects. 
3.3 Data  
Data for the price of different commodity groups and household current expenditure on those 
groups is taken from Consumer Trends, published by the UK Office of National Statistics 
(ONS). The data used for estimation are annual time series for 1964-2013. Data on total 
household numbers for selected years is taken from DGLC (2014), with data on intermediate 
years estimated by linear interpolation.
14
 Figure 2 indicates the change in expenditure shares 
over this period both between and within-groups. During this period, the share of food in total 
expenditure almost halved, the share of transport increased by 50% and the share of energy 
fell by 30%. Within the energy group, substitution by gas reduced the expenditure share of 
other fuels (coal and oil) from 42% in 1964 to 6% in 2013. These variations suggest that our 
results may be sensitive to the expenditure shares assumed - for example, the mean over the 
whole time period or those applying to 2013. We use the latter in what follows. 
  
                                                 
14 Two sets of time series data for expenditure and implied deflators (used for prices) are available: a) 1964 to 2010 
consistent with the UK National Accounts for 2010 (ONS, 2010) and b) 1997 to 2013 consistent with the National Accounts 
for 2011 (ONS, 2011). To create a consistent time series over the full period, we take the annual growth rates of expenditure 
and deflators during 1964-1997 from ONS (2010) and use these to adjust the 1997 data from ONS (2011).  
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Figure 2 Trends in UK household expenditure shares between 1964 and 2013 
Total expenditure 
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quasi-multi-regional, environmentally extended input-output model that provides estimates of 
the GHG intensity of UK household expenditure in each category (in tCO2e/£) for 2004 
(Druckman and Jackson, 2008).
1516
 These figures include both the direct emissions from the 
consumption of electricity
17
, heating fuels and vehicle fuels, and the embodied emissions 
from each stage of the supply chain for goods and services – which may occur either in the 
UK or overseas. We adjust these estimates to allow for the emissions associated with 
government expenditure of product taxation revenues.
18
  
Figure 3 (top) shows that expenditure on electricity, gas and other fuels is approximately 
twice as GHG intensive as expenditure on vehicle fuels and approximately four times as 
GHGs intensive as expenditure on other transport – which is the next most GHG intensive 
category. Overall, expenditure on energy commodities is approximately five times as GHG 
intensive as the share-weighted mean. But the high GHG intensity of energy commodities is 
offset by their small share of total expenditure (7% - Figure 3, middle), with the result that 
direct energy consumption only accounts for 27% of an average household’s ‘GHG footprint’ 
                                                 
15 The GHG intensity of a category is estimated from the GHG emissions associated with that category in 2004 (obtained 
from SELMA) divided by ‘real’ expenditure on that category in 2004 (reference year 2013). The exception is electricity 
where emissions are estimated from 2013 electricity consumption (in kWh) multiplied by an emission factor for 2013 
(kgCO2e/kWh). This adjustment is designed to reflect the large reduction in the GHG intensity of electricity over this 
period. It should be noted that the GHG intensity of marginal changes in electricity consumption may differ from the 
average GHG intensity. 
16 We do not have GHG intensity estimates for earlier or later years. But we observe that GHG intensities have tended to fall 
over time, while the proportion of emissions from outside the UK's borders has tended to increase. 
17 Emissions from electricity consumption are commonly labelled as direct, although they occur at the power station. 
18 Environmentally-Extended Input-Output (IO) models such as SELMA only include the GHG emissions associated with 
each expenditure category. But expenditures on different commodities include various taxes (such as Value Added Tax 
- VAT) which in turn are used to fund government expenditure. Since government spending is a separate category in 
the national accounts, the associated GHG emissions are normally excluded from the estimated GHG intensities of 
household expenditure. Exclusion of these emissions could bias estimates of rebound effects, in particular because 
differing levels of product taxation are applied to different goods and services. For example, in the UK there is 20% 
VAT on most goods and services; 5% VAT on electricity, gas and other fuels; zero rate VAT on most food products; 
and around 65% taxation on vehicle fuels. To eliminate this potential bias we: first, estimate the GHG intensity of UK 
government expenditure in 2004; second, use this to estimate the GHG emissions associated with taxation in each 
category; and third, add these to the emissions provided by SELMA for each expenditure category. This in turn leads to 
an adjusted GHG intensity of expenditure for each category which is used in the calculation of rebound effects. As the 
GHG intensity of government expenditure is relatively low, this adjustment does not significantly change our results. 
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(Figure 3, bottom), split between 19% domestic energy (i.e. electricity, gas and other fuels) 
and 8% vehicle fuels.  
The category providing the largest single contribution (25%) to total emissions is ‘other 
goods and services’ which includes expenditure on clothing, housing maintenance, water and 
furnishings and accounts for 45% of expenditure. The next highest is ‘other transport’ (12%) 
which includes non-fuel costs for private cars, public transport and some air travel. Since 
these categories have both a relatively high expenditure share and a relatively high GHG 
intensity they provide a significant contribution to total emissions (42%). 
Our estimates of GHG intensities allow for the variation of product taxation between 
categories: namely VAT exemption for food and non-alcoholic beverages, lower rate VAT 
for domestic energy and high taxation of vehicle fuels (~60% of retail price). The latter 
contributes to the comparatively low GHG intensity of vehicle fuels compared to domestic 
energy.  
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Figure 3 GHG intensity of expenditure (2004), share of total expenditure (2013) and share of 
total GHG emissions (2013) by category for an average household  
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4 Results 
4.1 Econometric results 
The two-stage budgeting assumptions model in Figure 1 leads to a total of 16 equations in 
five groups. The equations in each group are estimated as a system using the Iterative 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (ISUR) method which is suitable for imposing cross-
equation restrictions and corrects the estimates for any correlation of the error terms between 
equations. The equations in each group are estimated with homogeneity and symmetry 
restrictions imposed.
19
 The adding up restriction is imposed by dropping one of the equations 
in each group.  
                                                 
19 We also estimated the equations in each group without imposing homogeneity and symmetry restrictions, and used a Wald 
test to test for these restrictions both individually and in combination. Both the homogeneity and symmetry were rejected for 
the ‘energy group’ and symmetry was rejected for all groups. However, it is common for these restrictions to be rejected in 
demand models. As Edgerton (1997) notes: "… this should not be taken as an indication of a failure of the laws of demand, 
since the Slutsky conditions are derived at the micro level and only invariant to aggregation under very special assumptions. 
The elasticities calculated from the model therefore must be interpreted as ‘aggregate’ elasticities and not micro elasticities 
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Annex 2 summarises the parameter estimates for each group of equations and the results of 
the restrictions. Annex 3 summarises the between-group elasticity estimates, and Annex 4 
summarises the within-group estimates. The most relevant results are the total elasticity 
estimates for the energy and transport groups which are summarised in Tables 8 to 10. For 
ease of interpretation, all elasticities are expressed for quantities (q) rather than expenditure 
shares (w).  
 
Looking first at Annex 2 (Tables A.3 to A.7), we see that the overall fit of the equations is 
good, with more than two thirds of the parameter estimates being statistically significant at 
the 5% level and with most of the equations having an adjusted R
2
 exceeding 90%. We also 
apply the Portmanteau serial correlation test for each group and find no evidence of serial 
correlation. 
Looking at the total elasticity estimates (Tables 6-8), we make several observations. First, the 
total expenditure elasticities (Table 6) for domestic energy are relatively low – 0.07 for 
electricity and 0.09 for gas. These values are broadly comparable with those estimated from 
cross-sectional data in our previous work (Chitnis et al., 2014) where we showed that high-
income groups have very low expenditure elasticities for these commodities – which in turn 
has a significant influence on the overall mean. In contrast, the estimated expenditure 
elasticities for ‘other transport’ and the sub-categories of ‘other goods and services’ exceed 
unity, indicating that they are luxury goods. 
                                                                                                                                                        
coming from a representative consumer….” To ensure compatibility with consumer demand theory, we choose to impose the 
restrictions.  
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Second, the total uncompensated own-price elasticities (Table 8) for energy commodities 
have the expected sign with values of -0.41 for electricity, -0.59 for gas and -0.54 for vehicle 
fuels. For comparison, a review of studies by Espey and Espey (2004) found a mean short-
run elasticity of -0.35 (median -0.28) for electricity; a study by Asche et al. (2008) found 
short run elasticities of household natural gas demand to be -0.25 or less; and a review of 
studies by Goodwin et al. (2004) found a mean short-run elasticity for vehicle fuels of -0.25. 
Hence, our estimates appear to be at the high end of the range found in the literature - 
especially for gas and vehicle fuels. These high own-price elasticities will in turn translate 
into high estimates of the direct rebound effect. Since the expenditure elasticities for energy 
commodities are relatively small, the own-price response is primarily driven by substitution 
effects – as is indicated by the near equivalence of the compensated and uncompensated 
elasticities for these commodities (Tables 7 and 8).  
Third (Table 8), electricity and gas are found to be substitutes, and both of these are estimated 
to be complements for vehicle fuels. In addition, both ‘other transport’ and all subcategories 
within ‘other goods and services’ are estimated to be complements to energy commodities 
and will therefore contribute a negative indirect rebound effect. Food and drink products are 
estimated to be substitutes to electricity and gas and will contribute a (small) positive indirect 
rebound effect. However, food and drink are complements to vehicle fuels. 
Overall, the results suggest that the substitution effects for energy commodities outweigh the 
income effects, and changes in the price of one or more energy commodities will have their 
largest impact on the quantity of energy commodities demanded – both in terms of their own-
price response and the cross-price responses between energy commodities. Impacts on the 
quantity demanded of other commodities are much smaller. Since energy commodities are 
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also GHG intensive, they are likely to dominate the total rebound effect. This is demonstrated 
below, where we report the rebound results. 
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Table 6 Total expenditure elasticities ( xqi ) 
 Energy Transport Food and beverages Other goods and services 
 Electricity Gas Other 
fuels 
Vehicle 
fuels 
Other 
transport 
Food & 
non-
alcoholic 
beverages 
Alcoholic 
beverages & 
tobacco 
Recreation 
and culture 
Restaurants 
and hotels 
Education Communication Other 
Expenditure 
elasticity 
0.07 0.09 0.17 0.87 1.17 0.69 0.87 1.22 1.05 1.23 1.11 1.03 
Table 7 Total compensated cross-price elasticities- energy group (
ji pq
~ )  
 Energy Transport Food and beverages Other goods and services 
 Electricity Gas Other 
fuels 
Vehicle 
fuels 
Other 
transport 
Food and 
non-
alcoholic 
beverages 
Alcoholic 
beverages & 
tobacco 
Recreation 
and culture 
Restaurants 
and hotels 
Education Communication Other 
Electricity -0.41 0.17 -0.70 -0.02 - 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Gas 0.21 -0.59 0.60 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Other 
fuels 
-0.06 0.09 -0.56 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Vehicle 
fuels 
-0.03 -0.04 -0.07 
-0.54 
-0.09 -0.04 -0.06 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 
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Table 8 Total uncompensated cross-price elasticities-energy group (
ji pq
 ) 
 Energy Transport Food and beverages Other goods and services 
 Electricity Gas Other 
fuels 
Vehicle 
fuels 
Other 
transport 
Food and 
non-
alcoholic 
beverages 
Alcoholic 
beverages 
& 
tobacco 
Recreation 
and culture 
Restaurants 
and hotels 
Education Communication Other 
Electricity -0.41 0.17 -0.70 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Gas 0.21 -0.59 0.59 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Other 
fuels 
-0.06 0.09 -0.56 -0.003 -0.005 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Vehicle 
fuels 
-0.03 -0.04 -0.08 -0.56 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
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4.2 Estimates of rebound effects 
The estimated rebound effects are presented in four ways to illustrate both their magnitude 
and their underlying drivers. Specifically, we indicate the relative contribution of: a) income 
and substitution effects; b) direct and indirect rebound effects; c) direct and embodied 
emissions; and d) individual commodities. 
Our estimates of the total rebound effect are 41% for gas, 48% for electricity and 78% for 
vehicle fuels – and 55% for all three in combination (Figure 4). These estimates are larger 
than many in the literature, although smaller than those by Brannlund et al (2007) and 
Mizobuchi (2008). Net substitution across all commodities accounts for 60-70% of the total 
rebound for gas and electricity respectively and ~90% for vehicle fuels. In other words, 
substitution effects dominate. This demonstrates the importance of capturing substitution 
effects and suggests that studies that only estimate income effects (i.e. rely solely upon 
expenditure elasticities) could significantly underestimate the total rebound - particularly for 
vehicle fuels.  
Our estimates of direct rebound effects are 59% for gas, 41% for electricity and 56% for 
vehicle fuels (Figure 5) - indicating that they account for the majority of the total rebound. 
For gas, the direct rebound effect exceeds the total rebound effect, since the indirect rebound 
effect is negative. These estimates are at the high end of the range in the literature, 
particularly for vehicle fuels where most (primarily US) studies estimate direct rebound 
effects of 20% or less (Sorrell and Dimitropoulos, 2007b). Figure 6 demonstrates that the 
income effects mostly derive from other commodities (indirect rebound) while the 
substitution effects mostly derive from the energy service itself (direct rebound). Again, 
studies that only estimate income effects could erroneously conclude that the indirect rebound 
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effect accounts for the majority of the total rebound - whereas these results show the 
opposite. 
 
Direct emissions from energy commodities account for between 70 and 80% of the total 
rebound (Figure 7). This follows directly from the above, since it is the direct rebound effect 
that dominates the overall rebound effect and this is wholly direct emissions. Income effects 
are dominated by embodied emissions (i.e. non-energy commodities) while substitution 
effects are dominated by direct emissions (i.e. energy commodities) (Figure 8). Since the 
substitution effect is larger than the income effect, substitution both within and between 
energy commodities have the dominant influence on the overall results. Again, studies that 
neglect substitution effects could erroneously conclude that the total rebound effect consists 
primarily of embodied emissions - whereas these results show the opposite. 
 
Finally,  
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Figure 9 illustrates the relative contribution of different commodities to the total rebound 
(normalised to 100%). This again shows the dominance of own-price effects (direct rebound). 
Substitution between electricity and gas dampens the rebound effect for these two 
commodities, as does substitution away from ‘food and beverages’ and ‘other goods and 
services’. In contrast, the complementary relationship between energy commodities and both 
‘other transport’ and ‘vehicle fuels’ contributes a positive rebound effect. For vehicle fuels, 
the complementary relationship with electricity, gas and (particularly) other transport 
increases the total rebound. Since ‘other transport’ includes non-fuel costs for vehicles, a 
complementary relationship with vehicle fuels is to be expected. 
Figure 4 Estimated rebound effects – split by net income and substitution effects 
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Figure 5 Estimated rebound effects - split by direct and indirect rebound effects  
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Figure 6 Net income and substitution effects - split by direct and indirect rebound 
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Figure 7 Estimated rebound effects - split by direct and embodied emissions 
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Figure 8 Net income and substitution rebound effects - split by direct and embodied 
emissions 
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Figure 9 Contribution of different commodity groups to the total rebound effect 
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services. We further suggested we may have underestimated the total rebound since we did 
not model substitution effects. 
The present study shows that this suggestion was correct. By using price rather than 
expenditure elasticities, we now estimate significantly larger rebound effects, namely 41% 
for domestic gas use, 48% for electricity and 78% for vehicle fuels. The primary source of 
this rebound is increased consumption of cheaper energy services (i.e. direct rebound), and 
this is primarily driven by substitution effects. A clear implication of this finding is that 
studies that ignore substitution effects (e.g. those in Table 1) will underestimate the total 
rebound. Since all rebounds contribute to GHG emissions, an underestimate of rebound 
effects may lead to an overestimate of the impact of climate policies on global emissions. 
Policymakers are primarily concerned with national GHG emissions and direct rebounds, so 
tend to neglect embodied emissions and indirect rebounds. But in this particular case, it is 
direct rebounds that dominate. 
In practice, many studies focus solely upon direct rebound effects and estimate these from 
time-series data on individual energy services (e.g. transport, heating). Since, by definition, 
these neglect indirect rebound effects, their results may also underestimate the total rebound 
(unless, that is, the indirect rebound effect is negative). However, our results suggest that 
such studies may provide a better approximation to the total rebound effect than do studies 
that estimate the latter using only expenditure elasticities. Since the direct rebound effect 
appears larger than the indirect rebound effect, errors in estimating the former will matter 
more than errors in estimating the latter.  
We suspect, however, that the present study (along with others in Table 2) may overestimate 
the total rebound effect. The primary reason for this is that we assume the own-price 
47 
 
elasticity of energy demand to be equivalent to the efficiency elasticity of energy service 
demand (
eee pqq ,,
   ) and therefore to provide a suitable measure of the direct rebound 
effect. As Sorrell and Dimitropoulos (2007a) show, this equivalence only holds if energy 
prices are exogenous, energy service demand depends only on energy service prices (ps) and 
energy efficiency is constant. Absent these conditions, the own-price elasticity of energy 
demand will overestimate the direct rebound effect (Sorrell and Dimitropoulos, 2007a). 
Factors such as the endogeneity of energy efficiency and the asymmetric response of 
consumers to changes in energy prices may exacerbate this bias (Sorrell and Dimitropoulos, 
2007a). Hence, the simplicity of using energy commodities rather than energy services in the 
demand model comes at a cost. 
A further bias may arise when energy commodities provide multiple energy services (Chan 
and Gillingham, 2014). For example, if electric heating is a complement (substitute) to 
lighting, the own-price elasticity of electricity may overestimate (underestimate) the direct 
rebound effect for each of these services. Hunt and Ryan (2014) explore this point by 
estimating a LAIDS model of household energy purchases that includes covariates that they 
assume to be correlated with energy efficiency.
20
 Although not equivalent to including energy 
services directly within the demand model, their approach leads to lower estimates of energy 
price elasticities than specifications in which these covariates are omitted. This further 
suggests that the specification used here may overestimate energy price elasticities and hence 
also the total rebound effect.  
We further observe that our estimates of energy price elasticities are at the high end of the 
range found in the literature. Lower estimates of these elasticities would lead to lower 
                                                 
20. Hunt and Ryan try three approaches, namely: a simple time trend; historic energy prices; and historic energy prices 
allowing for asymmetric responses. 
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estimates of the direct rebound effect – and correspondingly higher estimates of the indirect 
rebound effect - although the sign of the latter is ambiguous. Since energy commodities are 
relatively GHG intensive, a low estimate of direct rebound is likely to outweigh a high 
estimate of indirect rebound, leading to a lower estimate of the total rebound. 
Further caveats relate to the methodological trade-offs discussed in section 2.3 - including the 
limited number of commodity groups employed, the potential sensitivity of the results to 
separability assumptions and the commodity breakdown chosen, and the absence of socio-
economic covariates. The results may also be sensitive to the choice of base year for the 
expenditure shares and the imposition or otherwise of parameter restrictions. Our 
methodology also neglects any supply-side responses to improved energy efficiency which 
may modify the estimated effects. The likely direction of bias from these sources is 
ambiguous, although they all represent important avenues for future research. But the priority 
is to find ways of incorporating energy services directly within a household demand model.  
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Annex 1 – Determinants of the sign of rebound effects 
Table A.1 Determinants of the sign of the direct rebound effect  
Nature 
of 
energy 
service 
Sign of 
expenditure 
elasticity  
Sign of 
compensated 
own-price 
elasticity  
Relative size of 
income and 
substitution 
effects 
Sign of 
uncompensated 
own-price 
elasticity 
Sign of 
direct 
rebound 
effect 
Normal 
good 
0, xqs  0
~
, ss pq  
Not relevant
 
0, ss pq  0DR  
Inferior 
good 
0, xqs  0
~
, ss pq  xqspq sss w ,,
~    0, ss pq  0DR  
Giffen 
good 
0, xqs  0
~
, ss pq  xqspq sss w ,,
~    0, ss pq  0DR  
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Table A.2 Determinants of the sign of the indirect rebound effect for commodity j 
Nature of 
commodity 
i  
Sign of 
expenditure 
elasticity 
for 
commodity 
i 
Sign of 
compensated 
cross-price 
elasticity 
Relative size of 
income and 
substitution effects 
Sign of 
uncompensated 
cross-price 
elasticity 
Sign of 
indirect 
rebound 
effect for 
commodity 
i 
Normal 
good 
0, xq
i
  0~
,

si pq
  
Net 
complements 
Not relevant 0
,

si pq

 
Gross 
complements 
0
iI
R  
Normal 
good 
0, xqi  0
~
,

si pq

 
Net substitutes 
xqspq isi
w ,,
~    0, si pq

 
Gross 
complements 
0
iI
R  
Normal 
good 
0, xqi  0
~
,

si pq

 
Net substitutes 
xqspq isi
w ,,
~    0, si pq

 
Gross substitutes 
0
iI
R  
Inferior 
good 
0, xqi  0
~
,

si pq

 
Net 
complements 
xqspq isi
w ,,
~    0, si pq

 
Gross 
complements 
0
iI
R  
Inferior 
good 
0, xqi  0
~
,

si pq

 
Net 
complements 
xqspq isi
w ,,
~    0, si pq

 
Gross substitutes 
0
iI
R  
Inferior 
good 
0, xqi  0
~
,

si pq

 
Net substitutes 
Not relevant
 
0
,

si pq

 
Gross substitutes 
0
iI
R  
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Annex 2 – Parameter estimates and restrictions tests 
Table A.3 Parameter estimates from first stage equations 
 r  r  rs  rs  
2R  
   Energy Transport Food and 
beverages 
Other 
goods and 
services
2 
Energy Transport Food and 
beverages 
 
Energy -0.03 
(-4.6)** 
-0.03 
(-4.2)** 
0.02 
(8.5)** 
-0.01 
(-2.8)** 
0.001 
(0.1) 
-0.01 0.13 
(1.2) 
0.13 
(3.6)** 
0.04 
(2.1)** 
0.98 
Transport 0.04 
(4.0)** 
0.02 
(1.4) 
-0.01 
(-2.8)** 
0.06 
(5.2)** 
-0.03 
(-3.5)** 
-0.02 0.48 
(2.8)** 
0.73 
(10.1)** 
-0.01 
(-0.3) 
0.96 
Food and 
beverages 
0.01 
(0.9) 
-0.03 
(-2.8)** 
0.001 
(0.1) 
-0.03 
(-3.5)** 
0.08 
(5.7)** 
-0.05 -0.55 
(-3.2)** 
-0.04 
(-0.6) 
0.82 
(21.0)** 
0.99 
Other goods 
and 
services
1 
0.98 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.07 -0.06 -0.82 -0.85 _ 
Notes: 
 2R is the adjusted coefficient of determination. 
 t-values in parenthesis. ** and * indicate statistical significance at 5% and 10% probability levels respectively. 
 Coefficients for ‘other goods & services’ are estimated from the adding-up and homogeneity restrictions. 
 The lagged budget share of ‘other goods & services’ is dropped to avoid co-linearity.  
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Table A.4 Parameter estimates from second stage equations – energy group 
 r
i  
r
i  
r
ij  
r
ij  
2R  
   Electricity  Gas Other fuels
1 
Electricity Gas  
Electricity -0.14 
(-0.8) 
-0.08 
(-1.9)** 
0.11 
(5.4)** 
-0.07 
(-3.8)** 
-0.05 
 
0.50 
(5.1)** 
0.06 
(1.5) 
0.87 
Gas 0.01 
(0.08) 
0.02 
(0.5) 
-0.07 
(-3.8)** 
0.04 
(2.2)** 
0.02 
 
0.27 
(2.8)** 
0.89 
(20.9)** 
0.98 
Other fuels
1 
1.13 0.06 -0.05 0.02 0.02 -0.77 -0.95 _ 
Notes: 
 Coefficients for ‘other goods & services’ are estimated from the adding-up restriction. 
 The lagged budget share of ‘other goods & services’ is dropped to avoid co-linearity.  
Table A.5 Parameter estimates from second stage equations – transport group 
 r
i  
r
i  
r
ij  
r
ij  
2R  
   Vehicle 
fuels 
Other 
transport
2 
Vehicle 
fuels 
 
Vehicle 
fuels 
-0.003 
(-0.2) 
-0.04 
(-5.5)** 
0.07 
(5.1)** 
-0.07 
(-5.1)** 
0.46 
(5.4)** 
0.74 
Other 
transport
1 
1.00 0.04 -0.07 0.07 -0.46 _ 
Notes: 
 Coefficients for ‘other transport’ are estimated from the adding-up and homogeneity restrictions. 
 The lagged budget share of ‘other transport’ is dropped to avoid co-linearity.  
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Table A.6 Parameter estimates from second stage equations – food and beverages group 
 r
i  
r
i  
r
ij  
r
ij  
2R  
   Food and 
non-
alcoholic 
beverages 
Alcoholic 
beverages 
and 
tobacco
2 
Food and 
non-
alcoholic 
beverages 
 
Food and 
non-alcoholic 
beverages 
0.16 
(2.6)** 
-0.05 
(-1.5) 
0.03 
(2.6)** 
-0.03 
(-2.6)** 
0.58 
(3.9)** 
0.91 
Alcoholic 
beverages 
and tobacco
1
  
0.84 0.05 -0.03 0.03 -0.58 _ 
Notes: 
 Coefficients for ‘alcoholic beverages and tobacco’ are estimated from the adding-up and homogeneity restrictions. 
 The lagged budget share of ‘alcoholic beverages and tobacco’ is dropped to avoid co-linearity.  
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Table A.7 Parameter estimates from second stage equations – other goods and services group  
 r
i  
r
i  
r
ij  
r
ij  
2R  
   Recreation 
& culture 
Restaurants 
& hotels 
Education Communication Other Recreation 
& culture 
Restaurants 
& hotels 
Education Communication  
Recreation & 
culture 
0.06 
(2.4)** 
0.02 
(3.1)** 
0.04 
(5.3)** 
-0.01 
(-1.1) 
0.01 
(2.5)** 
-0.02 
(-5.4)** 
-0.03 0.80 
(13.4)** 
-0.03 
(-0.3) 
0.10 
(0.6) 
0.19 
(1.5) 
 
0.87 
Restaurants & 
hotels 
0.08 
(3.1)** 
-0.002 
(-0.3) 
-0.01 
(-1.1) 
0.002 
(0.2) 
-0.01 
(-3.2)** 
0.01 
(3.6)** 
0.003 -0.04 
(-0.05) 
0.50 
(4.0)** 
-0.2 
(-1.0) 
0.01 
(0.1) 
0.93 
Education -0.01 
(-0.8) 
0.003 
(1.3) 
0.01 
(2.5)** 
-0.01 
(-3.2)** 
0.01 
(4.8)** 
-0.003 
(-1.9)** 
-0.01 -0.03 
(-1.2) 
0.14 
(3.6)** 
0.97 
(15.0)** 
-0.08 
(-1.3)** 
0.97 
Communication -0.02 
(-
2.1)** 
0.001 
(0.5) 
-0.02 
(-5.4)** 
0.01 
(3.6)** 
-0.003 
(-1.9)** 
0.02 
(8.1)** 
-0.01 0.19 
(7.6)** 
-0.005 
(-0.1) 
0.27 
(4.5)** 
0.45 
(7.2)** 
0.97 
Other 0.88 -0.02 -0.03 0.003 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.92 -0.61 -1.14 -0.57 _ 
Notes: 
 Coefficients for ‘other’ are estimated from the adding-up and homogeneity restrictions. 
 The lagged budget share of ‘other’ is dropped to avoid co-linearity.  
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Annex 3 – Between-group elasticity estimates 
Table A.9 Between-group expenditure elasticities (
xqr
 ) 
 Expenditure elasticity 
Energy 0.08 
Transport 1.11 
Food and beverages 0.74 
Other goods and services 1.07 
Table A.10 Between-group compensated price elasticities (
sr pq
~ ) 
 Energy Transport Food and beverages Other goods and services 
Energy -0.32 -0.04 0.04 0.04 
Transport -0.18 -0.43 -0.13 0.04 
Food and beverages 0.15 -0.11 -0.24 0.20 
Other goods and services 0.35 0.59 0.33 -0.26 
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Table A.11 Between-group uncompensated price elasticities (
sr pq
 ) 
 Energy Transport Food and beverages Other goods and services 
Energy -0.32 -0.08 0.01 -0.02 
Transport -0.19 -0.59 -0.24 -0.03 
Food and beverages 0.13 -0.26 -0.33 -0.08 
Other goods and services 0.29 -0.19 -0.19 -0.94 
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Annex 4 – Within-group elasticity estimates for domestic energy and vehicle fuels  
Table A.12 Within-group expenditure elasticities (
r
xq ri
 )  
 Energy Transport 
Electricity 0.83 - 
Gas 1.04 - 
Other fuels 2.06 - 
Vehicle fuels - 0.78 
Table A.13 Within-group compensated price elasticities ( r pq ji
~ )  
 Energy Transport 
 Electricity Gas Other fuels Vehicle fuels Other transport 
Electricity -0.29 0.32 -0.39 - - 
Gas 0.34 -0.43 -0.91 - - 
Other fuels -0.05 0.11 -0.52 - - 
Vehicle fuels - -  -0.47 0.12 
 
  
58 
 
Table A.14 Within-group uncompensated price elasticities ( r pq ji )  
 Energy Transport 
 Electricity Gas Other fuels Vehicle fuels Other transport 
Electricity -0.67 -0.15 -1.34 - - 
Gas -0.06 -0.93 -0.08 - - 
Other fuels -0.09 0.05 -0.64 - - 
Vehicle fuels - -  -0.63 -0.09 
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